Introduction
In The Purveyor of Truth, Derrida [2, 3] provides a very different reading from that of Lacan [4] in his Seminars (1955) (1956) (1957) of Edgar Allan Poe's The Purloined Letter (1845 [5] ). Derrida's The Purveyor of Truth has thus far found little favour with scholars. Many scholars, following what has become known as the 'classic' reading of Johnson [6] , in analysing or referring to these texts, have assumed that Derrida's reading, like that of Lacan, is concerned with finding the 'meaning' of The Purloined Letter or have chosen to focus on the alleged 'rivalry' between Lacan and Derrida, and for this reason have tended to dismiss or deride Derrida's reading [7, pp. 64-66; 8, pp. 1171-1180; 9; 10; 11, pp. 154-157; 12; 13, pp. 218-223; 14, pp. 51-71; 15, pp. 9-14; 16, pp. 190-195] . In the few instances in which The Purloined Letter has received attention in the legal context, Lacan's reading has mostly been chosen for analysis rather than that of Derrida [17; 18,  [2, pp. 148-152] in the letter of 20 June 1978, shows his despair at being misread even by those who have translated his work. These comments of Derrida indicate that 'something more' is at stake in The Purveyor of Truth than at first meets the eye. The temptation to be harsh in evaluating Johnson's essay and those following in her step should nevertheless be resisted. Not only is Derrida's text an extremely complex one, even more so than that of Lacan, but the Johnson essay was published before the re-publication of The Purveyor of Truth in The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, which has made it easier to understand the context of Derrida's essay. The contention in the present article is that an exploration of the 'something more' in The Purveyor of Truth must proceed through a reading of the other essays collated in The Post Card, and certain of Derrida's other texts, especially those on psychoanalysis. What becomes clear from a reading of these texts is that in The Purveyor of Truth Derrida is not simply concerned with proposing a 'better' reading-than that of Lacan-of The Purloined Letter, but more importantly with the economy of the death drive and the influence that this has on psychoanalysis and the reading of texts. Different from that of Lacan, Derrida's reading of The Purloined Letter is not hermeneutic-semantic in nature [2, p. 432 ]. The present article will explore the reason for the differences between Derrida's and Lacan's readings of The Purloined Letter through an analysis of primarily Derrida's text. 1 The emphasis will thus be on Derrida's reading which will be explored within the broader context of his thinking on psychoanalysis. Lacanian thinking, restricted primarily to the time of the Écrits, will be elaborated upon only in order to place Derrida's reading within context.
Derrida's reading of The Purloined Letter, it will be contended here, is of great importance for constitutional interpretation. Contemporary approaches to constitutional interpretation can be said to be divided between those which are based on the idea that meaning is generated by the intention of the author and those which accord some role to the interpreter of the text and/or to the existing context in the generation of meaning. With respect to the latter approaches, they furthermore diverge between those which seek to hold the interpreter to more or less strict substantive and/or procedural criteria [25] [26] [27] [28] and those which accord to the interpreter or to interpretive communities the primary role and responsibility in textual interpretation [29, 30] . The above approaches to interpretation in general accord very little if any importance to psychoanalytic theory. Where psychoanalytic theory is taken account of in approaches to interpretation, Freud and/or Lacan, at times also in combination with Derrida, are usually the bases for such analyses. 2 These approaches tend to posit a relation between law and justice where the latter is understood with reference to Oedipal desire [32, pp. 9-25; 33 , pp. 297-369; 34, pp. . The importance of Derrida's The Purveyor of Truth lies in its exploration of an approach to reading which goes beyond the Oedipus complex and therefore also beyond a hermeneutic-semantic approach, whilst relying on some of the key insights of Freud and which can at the same time be extended to constitutional reading. Although Derrida's texts are frequently invoked in proposing alternative approaches to constitutional interpretation, these approaches generally do not take adequate account of Derrida's relation to psychoanalysis (and where it is touched upon, do not always show an adequate appreciation of the differences between Derrida's approach and that of Lacan). This almost inevitably leads to a moderation of the implications of Derrida's thinking for constitutional reading. Through a detailed analysis of the thinking that informs Derrida's approach to reading in The Purveyor of Truth in this article and by pointing to the profound differences between his reading and that of Lacan, some of the implications for constitutional interpretation will be spelled out in the concluding section. 3 
2
The Purloined Letter
The story as told by Poe starts with two friends (the narrator and Dupin) who are joined in the library of Dupin by the Prefect of Police. The Prefect tells them of the theft of a letter. The Queen of France, having received a letter, possibly from a lover or a (co-)conspirator, is surprised in her private chambers by the King. She does not have time to hide the letter and therefore places it on a table. They are in turn joined by a Minister (D), who notices the Queen's embarrassment, as well as the cause for it. Knowing that she cannot draw attention to the letter for fear of the King finding out about it, the Minister takes the letter before her eyes-the King not noticing anything-and replaces it by a similar-looking letter. The identity of the thief is thus known, but the Prefect, having secretly searched the premises of the Minister in his absence for the past 3 months, has been unable to find the letter. The Minister, in the meantime, has been using the letter to blackmail the Queen. Dupin, who has shown himself to be an acute observer and solver of crimes in two previously recounted stories by Poe (The Murders in the Rue Morgue and The Mystery of Marie Roget) visits the Minister in his apartment, sees the letter (in slightly altered form) hanging openly on a pasteboard card-rack. It appears that the Prefect and his team looked for the letter in its original form only and on the assumption that it would be hidden, and therefore were unable to find it. The next day, Dupin visits again to collect his intentionally-left-behind snuff-box, having also arranged for a disturbance caused by a 'mad-man' outside, which distracts the Minister and thus giving Dupin an opportunity to take the letter and to replace it by a replica. He leaves a note making it clear to the Minister that he (Dupin) had taken it, in return for a misdeed by the Minister against him (Dupin) some time ago. The inscription alludes to the myth of the brothers Atreus and Thyestes, the latter having committed adultery with Atreus's wife, with Atreus in revenge killing Thyestes's sons and serving them to Thyestes at a banquet. 4 Dupin, in return for a monetary award, gives the letter to the Prefect who returns the letter to the Queen. Dupin's calculation is that the Minister, not realizing that the letter has been taken from his apartment, will continue with his blackmail of the Queen, this inevitably leading, in the changed circumstances, to his downfall. [36] . For reasons of space this analysis cannot be undertaken here. 4 See also Derrida [37] . In some versions of this myth only one son (Plisthenes) is referred to.
psychological make-up of the author (as for example that of Bonaparte [39, 40] In Lacan's reading, the letter in The Purloined Letter is furthermore not stolen, but simply diverted from its path [4, pp. 20-21] . The diversion of the letter, its nondelivery or sufferance makes those characters in the story who take possession of the letter after the Queen 'lost' it (the Minister, and one of the Dupins) 'suffer' or become 'feminised' in identifying with the Queen [2, pp. 450, 452] . This is because of the power that the imaginary phallus exercises over them through the letter. By possessing the letter they each effectively find themselves in the position of someone attempting to be the missing (imaginary) phallus of the mother (the Queen) in order to satisfy the desire of the mother, instead of accepting their own (symbolic) castration as well as that of the mother. First the Queen, in the first ('primal') scene, then the Minister and (the one) Dupin in the second scene, thus find themselves within the imaginary order [2, pp. 438-439; 4, pp. [21] [22] . 6 This can be understood within the context of Lacan's theory that the child in a successful resolution of the Oedipus complex renounces the aspiration to be the phallus for the mother, leading to his association with the law of the Name-of-the-Father (the symbolic order). It also requires, and here lies the brilliance of Dupin, that the analysand comes to realise through the intervention of the analyst (with speech playing a central role) that the phallus is not something 'real' or an actual object that was lost by the mother, but a signifier. . Derrida furthermore refers to the epigraph to The Murders in the Rue Morgue (pointing inter alia to the possible name Achilles assumed when he hid himself among women) and the 'preface' (containing reflections on the skills of an analyst, also in playing games) that one finds here which precedes the first meeting between Dupin and the narrator. The introduction to Dupin, which the narrator provides, includes an explanation of his unfortunate financial position (left only with a small remnant of his paternal inheritance) and a reference to something which exceeds the strict economy he has to impose on himself, like a gift without return: the luxury of books, which Dupin allows himself. The notion of luxury will return in the introductory paragraph of The Purloined Letter in the (two-fold)
form of meditation and meerschaum [2, p. 487] . Between the narrator and Dupin, a financial relation is furthermore established in terms of which Dupin provides the narrator with ''priceless writing'' and the narrator provides for Dupin, the analyst financially, also in the form of accommodation. The narrator in other words pays (Dupin) in order to write or speak and he also makes Dupin speak. This shows the involvement and participation in the narration of the narrator, making it impossible for him to be a simple neutral observer and narrator of Oedipal triangles. The narrator also rents an old house where no one can find them (the narrator and Dupin) where the two of them live like madmen in secret and in the dark of night (actual and feigned) whence the narrator narrates his progressive identification with Dupin [2, pp. 489-490].
Insofar as the textual fiction which frames the narration is concerned, Derrida draws a distinction between the author and his actions; the inscriber (the scriptor-fictor) and the inscribing (the scription-fiction named [t]he tension which then arose in what had hitherto been an inanimate substance endeavoured to cancel itself out. In this way the first instinct came into being: the instinct to return to the inanimate state. It was still an easy matter at that time for a living substance to die; the course of its life was probably only a brief one, whose direction was determined by the chemical structure of the young life. For a long time, perhaps, living substance was thus being constantly created afresh and easily dying, till decisive external influences altered in such a way as to oblige the still surviving substance to diverge ever more widely from its original course of life and to make ever more complicated détours before reaching its aim of death. These circuitous paths to death, faithfully kept to by the conservative instincts, would thus present us to-day with the picture of the phenomena of life.
Life is in other words a detour which differs/defers not primarily with the aim of pleasure or conservation, but with the aim of death, or a return to the inorganic state [2, p. 354] . 17 This hypothesis is related to the theory of Hering in terms of which a dualism exists in instinctual life: an assimilatory process and a dis-similatory process, the first being constructive and the latter destructive [ 21 can be said to be the messenger sending letters to the self from the other (death). 22 The pleasure and reality principles are within this structure or rather 'stricture', ''only an internal, secondary, and conditional modification of the absolute and unconditional The organism (or every living organization, every ''corpus'', every ''movement'') conserves itself, spares itself, maintains itself via every kind of differentiated relay, intermediary destination, correspondences of short or long term, short or long letters [courrier] . Not in order to keep oneself from death, or to maintain oneself against death, but only in order to avoid a death which would not amount to itself [ne lui reviendrait pas], in order to cut off a death that would not be its own or that of its own. In the detour of the step, in the step of the detour, the organism keeps itself from the other which might steal its death from it. It keeps itself from the other who might give it the death it would not have given to itself by itself (for this is a theory of suicide deferred, or by correspondence), the death that it would not have announced to itself, signified by a sentence, a letter, or a notification that is more or less telegraphic, and of which it would be simultaneously the sender, the receiver, and the transmitter, that is, from one end of the itinerary to the other, and in every sense of the word, the facteur. Addressor and addressee of the news, teleguiding its … legacy, autoteleguiding it, it … wishes to toll its own knell, wishes the impossible [footnote omitted].
The conservative drives are therefore the guardians of life, but by the same token ('originally') also the sentinels or satellites of death [2, pp. 82, 360; 42, p. 39] . The same idea can be expressed with reference to the notion of binding, which although it makes room for the pleasure principle, can be said to be ultimately in service of the 23 Derrida explores this denial of debt with reference to the notion of 'envy'. At stake, it appears, is the same jealousy that is evident in the Freudian 'household' (in the analysis of Ernst's fort/da game) between Freud, the husband in law, and Ernst, in relation to Sophie. In Glas, Derrida [49, p. 134b] 24 Traces and remainders of the inorganic state have never reached consciousness [2, p. 346]. They are not inscribed in the system perception-consciousness, but in another system, which could be referred to as a psychic aneconomy [2, p. 346; 53, pp. 9-10]. The 'memory' of the return to the inorganic state could also be described as the 'memory' of an original wound, a trauma which had not taken place and which is repressed or as an unanalysed remainder of the unconscious which 'houses' absolute pleasure [2, pp. 304, 362; 54, pp. xx, xlii]. 25 In recalling oneself to oneself (in appropriating oneself) one is placed in relation to the memory of the original wound. This thinking should not, at least not on Derrida's reading, be equated with a form of biological or psychic determinism. Firstly, it concerns the technical substrates of unconscious memory-the drives being situated at the frontier between the somatic and the psychic [1, p. 123; 60, pp. 121-122; 61, p. 397]. Secondly, as should be clear when Derrida contends that a letter may always not arrive at its destination, this thinking does not give rise to determinacy, but rather to chance or dissemination, the only chance for there to be history, meaning, presence, truth, language etc. [1, p. 128]. 26 Derrida's athetic reading of Beyond does not seek to prove that there 'is' indeed a beyond to the pleasure principle: the death drive does not exist and does not present itself as such [2, pp. 362, 366] . In seeking to account for Freud's actions in writing Beyond (distancing the pleasure principle, acting as the devil's advocate, but continually returning it to himself as Ernst does with the spool attached to a string), Derrida instead shows that it is a matter of coming back within the pleasure principle [2, pp. 353, 354, 379-380, 395 ). That which is excluded by Lacan in his reading of The Purloined Letter, is shown by Derrida to be the condition of possibility of the narration. Derrida's analysis of the death drive-which, it should be noted, differs markedly from the Lacanian understanding thereof as expressed in the Écrits, 27 as well as of those who have adopted the Lacanian understanding of the Freudian death drive in the ethical, political and legal context [64, p. 245; 65, p. 47]-translates into a different role for the Oedipus complex, the castration complex and the role of the 'mother'. The Oedipus complex, Derrida contends, is only one of the possible effects of différance, which would be another name for castration or of Medusa's head, the fear of which causes an erection [2, pp. 340-341; 49, pp. 46a, 59a]. 28 Linked as death is to différance, castration can also be said to equal death and to be another 'name' for dissemination [49, p. 44a; 51, p. 306 n. 67]. In Lacan's Seminar, we could furthermore say, the mother is the term of a regression, a signified of the last instance [49, p. 116b ]. 29 The 'mother' plays a very different role in Derrida's 'model'. She is the non-place of absolute pleasure (death) and is to be affirmed. In Derrida's texts, the 'mother' could be said to 'stand' for the 'pre-origin' from which we return repeatedly, as the following passages from Glas indicates: ''The mother is a thief and a beggar. She appropriates everything, but because she has nothing that is properly hers'' [49, p. 150b ]. This idea is developed further in some of Derrida's other texts where he refers with approval to the archi-psychoanalytic myth of Imre Hermann (adopted also by Nicholas Abraham) regarding a traumatic archi-event of de-clinging (referring to primates clinging to the fleece of the mother) 30 which constructs the human topical structure [54, pp. xxxii-xxxiii; 66, p. 6]. This does not seek to privilege the 'natural' mother. The mother is a figure for death, absolute pleasure, the already, 31 as is the hymen [49, pp. 134b, 136b; 51, pp. 222-223].
The Death Drive and The Purveyor of Truth
The above analysis assists us in understanding better what is at stake in The Purveyor of Truth, more specifically insofar as the frame, the double, the (posting of) letter(s), as well as the divisibility and fragmentation of the letter are concerned. As should be clear, all of these are related to the 'notions' of dissemination and the death drive and to the life-death stricture that Freud discusses in Beyond. Both in his reading of Beyond and The Purloined Letter, Derrida seeks to affirm absolute pleasure (the death drive) as a 'pre-origin' more 'original' than and independent of the pleasure principle. It is from here (this no-place) 32 of the diabolical that 'letters' are sent to the self [2, pp. 341-342]:
unconditional, unsurpassable, and as such interminable'-the subject being understood as defined by his historicity'' (at pp. 261-262); see further Lacan [63, pp. 253-268] . 28 See also Derrida [49, p. 65b ] on castrating oneself in writing. 29 Derrida nevertheless does not here specifically refer to Lacan. 30 The fleece is in turn closely related to the notion of text; see Derrida [66, pp. 5-6] . 31 See also Derrida [55, pp. 156, 159] where he says that the 'true' or 'natural' mother herself is always already a substitute or supplement; and Derrida [67, pp. 12-13] where he explains why 'woman' plays the important role she does in his texts. This relates to the fact that woman is the excluded other in most cultures and the fact she therefore represents the figure of the absolute other. See further Derrida [49, p. 84bi] where he refers to the already (deja) giving birth to itself (Genet) as a cadaver. 32 Derrida [2, p. 489 ] also refers to the secret place whence all letters are sent out as a consequence of two madmen speculating.
The demon is the revenance which repeats its entrance, coming back [revenant] from one knows not where…inherited from one knows not whom, but already persecutory, by means of the simple form of its return, indefatigably repetitive, independent of every apparent desire, automatic…this automaton comes back [revient] without coming back [revenir à] to anyone, it produces effects of ventriloquism without origin, without emission, and without addressee. It is only posted, the post in its ''pure'' state, a kind of mailman [facteur] without destination. Tele-without telos. Finality without end, the beauty of the devil. It no longer obeys the subject whom it persecutes with its return. It no longer obeys the master, the name of the master being given to the subject constructed according to the economy of the PP, or to the PP it(him)self. Freud insisted upon the passivity, the apparent passivity of the persons thus visited…but also upon the fact that such a demonic visitation is not confined to neurosis. [65] [66] . In recalling itself to itself, the self sends away the non-proper; it sends itself letters not to keep itself from death but only in order to avoid a death which would not amount to itself [2, pp. 355, 356] . The self is the sender, the receiver and the transmitter [2, pp. 355, 356] . This is nevertheless a secondary process, a supplementary sending. As the quotation above shows, the letters are firstly sent or posted by the death drive. 34 It is in other words firstly the primary process that sends a postal message in binding or limiting itself from absolute expenditure or free cathectic energy [2, pp. 394, 395] . This is followed by a supplementary sending (post, binding) by the secondary process. Because of this division of the letter, because of this distancing from the self, the risk is there that the letter will not arrive at its destination (the self). 35 The possible non-arrival of the letter (from the self to the self) can nevertheless be said to entail a chance, the mis-address of a chance with the subject no longer being in control [2, pp. [I]n the first time of the contact between two forces [referring to death and life], repetition has begun. Life is already threatened by the origin of the memory which constitutes it, and by the breaching which it resists, the effraction which it can contain only by repeating it.
Repetition, as we furthermore saw, takes place within the zone of ('preoriginary') différance [48, p. 255] . In other words, repetition takes place in the zone between the primary and secondary processes. The Purloined Letter would therefore not entail the repetition of something original (for example the Oedipus complex), but a preoriginary repetition which takes place in the zone of différance.
Implications
It should now be clear that Derrida's reading of The Purloined Letter is not simply one which seeks to impose thereon a different interpretation than that of Lacan. Derrida's reading could be said to seek to bring out that which conditions a sending such as The Purloined Letter, not simply with reference to the Oedipal unconscious, but with reference to that which precedes as 'pre-origin' any possible Oedipus complex; in other words, framing, the double or dissemination. We saw in Derrida's reading of Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle how the latter 'notions' are all related to the death drive which is at work in all organisms, organisations and institutions. As will be indicated briefly below, this holds significant implications for constitutional interpretation. If we follow Lacan's hermeneutic approach of the unconscious as portrayed in the Seminar, we are not confronted with dissemination, fragmentation without return or what would later be referred to by Derrida as justice [70] . Lacan's Seminar remains tied to speech, origin, truth, presence and meaning and thus to a restricted economy involving a circular return to the same [2, pp. 425, 437, 441]. As we saw, Derrida's exposition of the death drive, which finds expression through the frame and the double, escapes and disorganises the Lacanian symbolic order and is a 'law' that must be followed in every reading of texts.
Insofar as the text of a constitution is concerned, a number of similarities with The Purloined Letter appear. It can be said to be 'sent' in a similar way as The Purloined Letter and to have a similar structure as that text, the latter in turn corresponding with the life-death stricture described above [24, p. 171] . As Derrida makes clear in Declarations of Independence (with its related themes of writing, representation, the proper name and the signature), and also in Force of Law, a constitution's condition of possibility is not to be found in anything outside the text such as the people or God which provide a stable point of reference for interpretation [35, 70] . These attempted stabilisers of meaning are themselves placed on-stage in the text (as happens also with the narrator in The Purloined Letter), usually in the preamble of a constitution, thereby setting them adrift. A constitution, in its preamble, also typically, like The Purloined Letter, begins by referring back to other (textual) events and to other texts (such as preceding constitutions, the constitutions of other countries and international treaties) which precede the adoption of the constitution. The repetition that is at stake in a constitution is not however of something original, but as explained above in the context of the death drive, an originary repetition taking place in the zone of différance. If we furthermore follow Austin, as Derrida does, in stating that only a sentence has meaning, the title of a constitution-which invariably is not a sentence-can similarly be said to overflow the constitution, opening it to meaninglessness, dissemination, or a general economy [71, pp. 112-115] . Some of the substantive provisions of a constitution such as those providing for fundamental rights, if read in the manner proposed by Derrida, also include in a way similar to the luxury of books, meditation and meerschaum in The Purloined Letter, that which goes beyond a strict economy, like a gift without exchange. 40 To the hermeneut who is concerned only with meaning, the above analysis will be of little relevance. If account is however taken of this textual drift, a constitution, similar to The Purloined Letter, can be said to be written as an expression of a desire for or drive towards death or absolute pleasure or what can also be referred to as justice. 41 As Derrida [70] economy, of rights, of law, of reason, and of meaning. It calls for ''a rending decision as the decision of the other. Of the absolute other in me, the other as the absolute that decides on me in me'' [37, p. 68; 70, pp. 26-28] . This is an intrinsic part of every interpretation of a constitution [70, p. 37] . Interpretation which is only hermeneuticsemantic in nature excludes or neutralises the double law of a constitution in an attempt to avoid uncontrollable anxiety. It is furthermore based on the flawed belief that a constitution imposes only a strict economy and thus always returns to its sender. This makes of constitutional interpretation simply a circular and selflegitimating activity which remains caught-even in progressive versions thereofwithin the trappings of democratic constitutionalism [72, pp. 6-18] . A break with constitutional democracy understood as ipseity or auto-affection is possible only if account is taken of Derrida's approach to reading in The Purveyor of Truth.
